There is no doubting the Christian roots of Australia's common law and legal system. Despite that history, in contemporary Australia, an observation that a particular law is consistent with or that it has been derived from Christian morality is more likely to be raised as a source of complaint and derision by persons seeking to change the law than recognised as a grounds for maintaining a traditional position. This article considers the relationship between Christianity and the law in Australia. The article argues that the relationship between Christianity and the law in Australia is under severe strain such that the relationship may be better described as an acrimonious divorce rather than a trial separation. The article argues that conflict between
Christianity and the law is increasing to the extent that there is a need for law reform to provide greater protection of religious freedom. New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land in so far as they were applicable. 9 The next year, on the western side of Australia, Lieutenant-Governor James Stirling RN proclaimed the Swan River Colony. The Swan River Colony also inherited the Western legal tradition as it had developed in Britain and its common law. Specifically, the Swan River Colony inherited English laws in place as at 1 June 1829 so far as they were applicable.
10
In the Western legal tradition, law is autonomous, exercises a central role, and enjoys moral authority. 11 Whilst the seeds of these traditions were planted in the Greco-Roman world the tradition inherited in Australia had grown in the soil of Christianity. 12 In the Western legal tradition law is separately identifiable from custom, morality, religion or politics. This is not to say that law cannot reflect or be influenced by these things but to recognise that, even where laws coincide with religious prescriptions or proscriptions, the law is enforced in its own right and according to its own rules and norms not as a matter of religious obligation but of civic duty. 13 In a society with an almost uniform understanding of morality -such as a morality founded on a Christian religious tradition or on Christian religious traditions -there may be very substantial overlap and uniformity between the civic law and religious morality.
The two can nevertheless be separately understood and studied -one in law schools and the other in schools of theology, for example. They also impose separate obligations: one may impose temporal obligations and punishments and the other spiritual or eschatological. In the Western legal tradition and increasingly so law is the central means of governing life and society. 14 In this tradition, social control and social change are achieved by the law. 15 This is because of the third aspect of this tradition which is fidelity to the law because of its moral authority. 16 In the Western legal tradition, law commands a high level of respect because of its status as law. People tend to obey laws simply because they are laws and they do so
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The Western Australian Jurist 5 ! ! ! ! habitually and independently of their own feelings about the law rather than from regular and conscious fear of sanction. 17 This tradition arose in a Christian context as Parkinson explains:
The close relationship between law and theology in the formation of the western legal tradition, the belief in law as ultimately given by God and the idea that there were natural laws which governed human relations meant that law was imbued with a certain aura of sacredness. The close relationship between law and faith meant that law was believed in; for law, in Caesar's kingdom, was an aspect of the will of God.
18
Where there is a basic general agreement on moral questions and where the majority of a population follows faiths within the Christian traditions, the civil law is likely to largely reflect the moral principles of Christianity and so the Western legal traditions of centrality, moral authority and fidelity to the law make a degree of rational and logical sense. The colonists also brought the related 'rule of law' with them. This requires not just the citizens but the government to act according to the law and 'the principle of equality before the law.' 19 Like the Western legal tradition of which it really forms a part as Williams explains 'the rule of law is quintessentially a product of Judeo-Christianity.'
20
The Empire of which the new colonies formed part had developed in a close relationship with the state Church of England for two hundred years. 21 The Christian influence on the common law and the laws of England pre-dated the Reformation and the foundation of the Church of England. The influence of Christianity on the Western legal tradition has been so deep that
Parkinson has observed that 'Christianity was to the formation of the Western legal tradition as the womb is to human life.' 22 The relationship between Christianity and the laws of [I]n a Christian commonwealth the Church and the State are one and the same thing, being integral parts of the same whole … Religion is so far, in my opinion, from being out of the province or the duty of a Christian magistrate, that it is, and it ought to be not only his care, but the principal thing in his care: because it is one of the great bonds of human society, and its object the supreme good, the ultimate end and object of man himself.
25
On a similar theme in 1815 John Bowles, a High Church of England apologist, observed that:
The constitution of this country is composed of two distinct establishments, the one civil, the other ecclesiastical, which are so closely woven together, that the destruction of either must prove fatal to both. 42 God entering the world in the form of a human person, Jesus 45 and elective abortion 46 and that eternal judgment was a reality. 47 Like the Western legal tradition the common law was saturated with the JudeoChristian worldview. As Robert Pasley has observed:
The fundamental conceptions of equality before the law, of the accountability of the ruler to
God and the law, of civil rights and liberties, of the individual's responsibility for his own acts, of mens rea, of the sanctity of promises, in fact the whole structure and content of our constitutional, civil and criminal law are all received from the Judeo-Christian tradition and can only be fully understood by one who has studied and mastered that tradition. 48 With that general background given the contemporary significance of the meaning of marriage in Australia, Part II of the article considers the influence of the Western legal tradition and Christianity in the laws relating to marriage at the foundation of the antipodean colonies and at the time of the reception of English laws.
II MARRIAGE IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION
Heterosexual, monogamous relationships have long been recognised as marriage in the Western legal tradition. 49 This form of marriage existed well before Christianity in Ancient
Greece and Ancient Rome and other pre-Judeo-Christian civilisations and it has existed in societies which are not and never have been Christian. 50 In the Western legal tradition state interest in regulating, preferencing, and recognising as marriages only heterosexual,
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The Western Australian Jurist to defend itself and marriage provided a structure in which children could be effectively Similarly without first obtaining a licence to dispense with the publication of marriage banns it was a felony to celebrate a marriage without their publication. Acting contrary to these requirements was no trivial matter because a conviction of one of these felonies attracted a penalty of transportation to America for 14 years. 58 The reality of the multi-faith and multi- 
The Western Australian Jurist 11 ! ! ! ! marriage was and why it existed. Lord Broughton stated that Christianity alone explained why marriage under the common law was between one man and one woman. In doing so with these observations he set the tone for future English cases on the meaning of marriage:
If indeed there go two things under one and the same name in different countries -if that which is called marriage is of a different nature in each -there may be some room for holding that we are to consider the thing to which the parties have bound themselves, according to its legal acceptance in the country where the obligation was contracted. But marriage is one and the same thing substantially all the Christian world over. Our whole law of marriage assumes this;
and it is important to observe, that we regard it as a wholly different thing, a wholly different status, from Turkish or other marriages among infidel nations, because we clearly never should recognise the plurality of wives, and consequent validity of second marriages, standing the first, which second marriages the laws of those countries authorise and validate. This cannot be put upon any rational ground except our holding that the infidel marriage to be something different from the Christian and our also holding Christian marriage to be the same everywhere. Similarly in 1880 Lush LJ wrote that:
[T[here is no analogy whatever between the union of a man and a woman in a country where polygamy is allowed, and the union of a man and a woman in a Christian country. Marriage in the contemplation of every Christian community is the union of a man and one woman to the Writing in 1888 Stirling J echoed those earlier judgments when he opined that:
[A] union formed between a man and a woman in a foreign country, although it may there bear the name of marriage, and the parties to it may there be designated husband and wife, is not a valid marriage according to the laws of England unless it be formed on the same basis as marriages throughout Christendom, and be its essence "the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of others."
65
In 1890 the President of the Probate Division in England recognised that, in these earlier decisions, the phrase 'Christian marriage' had been used as a sort of shorthand but again did not find it necessary to include any rational or reasoned justification of marriage in England having that meaning. As he observed:
The principle which has been laid down by those cases is that a marriage which is not that of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others, though it may pass by the name of a marriage is not the status which the English law contemplates when dealing with the subject of marriage.
66
[T]hough throughout the judgments that have been given on this subject, the phrases "Christian marriage", "marriage in Christendom," or some equivalent phrase, has been used, that has only been for convenience to express the idea. But the idea which was to be expressed was this, that the only marriage recognised in Christian countries and in Christendom is the marriage of the exclusive kind that I have mentioned …
67
Again it is important to recognise that writing in the context of England in the 19 th century it was simply not necessary for the judges to reach back to Aristotle or Ulpian or to the GrecoRoman foundations of marriage or to explain -even in passing -the centrality of marriage to the state because all of that meaning was encapsulated in the phrases which were used. This was so whether the precise phrase was 'Christian marriage', 'marriage in Christendom', or 
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The Western Australian Jurist 13 ! ! ! ! something similar. As the various Australian colonies were established, each passed its own marriage laws providing for state recognition of marriages between one man and one woman and legislating permissible degrees of consanguinity and marriage ages. 68 Again these colonies were overwhelmingly populated by Christians and by Europeans from the Western legal tradition. No colonies recognised polygamous marriages, marriages between two persons of the same sex or customary marriages of Australia's Aboriginal peoples and bigamy has always been a criminal offence. 69 As the article will explain in Part IV the lack of jurisprudential development of an expressed reasoned and rational foundation for the 'idea' of marriage in these cases meant that, more than a hundred years later, when Christianity was no longer recognised, without question, as being 'parcel of the laws' 70 the definition of marriage contained in those decisions was ripe for criticism and rejection. Vol 9
III THE RELIGIOUS MAKE-UP
The Western Australian Jurist 17 ! ! ! ! We live at a time that is broadly characterised by a subliminal relativism that penetrates every area of life … Sometimes this relativism becomes aggressive, when it opposes those who claim to know where the truth or meaning of life is to be found. And we observe that this relativism exerts more and more influence on human relationships and on society … Many no longer seem capable of any form of self-denial or of making a sacrifice for others. Even the altruistic commitment to the common good, in the social and cultural sphere or on behalf of the needy, is in decline. Others are now quite incapable of committing themselves unreservedly to a single partner. We see that in our affluent western world much is lacking. Many people lack experience of God's goodness. 108 Speaking of the individualism of our time Somerville has observed:
In the West, we live in an era of intense individualism. This prevailing attitude has been described as "individualism gone wild" because it often excludes any sense of community.
Many arguments that favour the availability of, and especially unrestricted access to, reproductive technologies, genetic technology, and euthanasia are based on claims of respect for individual rights. Advocates believe that these claims are essentially matters of personal morality and they involve only, or at least primarily individuals …
109
The 'rule of law' itself gives no firm foundation for moral positions or legislative reform because the extent to which it demands 'equality' is itself in contention. Conservatives tend to argue that the rule of law means that everyone is equal before the law. In other words, conservatives are likely to argue that the rule guarantees independent courts and the application of the law to politicians and citizens equally. This is not the same thing as using the term 'rule of law' to demand differential treatment of citizens with differing characteristics with the professed intention of achieving some other often unexpressed form of 'equality'. The term 'equality' depends for its meaning on usage in a context. As the Chief Justice of New South Wales, the Honourable Tom Bathurst SC observed in his Opening of Law Term speech of 2018:
The difficulty with the rule of law as a criterion for intervention is that it is far from being an objective and uncontested concept. Indeed, its authority is invoked in support of both sides of the ideological divide. While conservatives tend to rely on thinner, procedural conceptions of One key principle of the idea of equality is that although human beings are different in innumerable respects, our common humanity requires that we are all treated equally on merit.
That means that for every difference in treatment, there must be good and relevant reasons. The law is becoming more fragmented, more subjective, geared more to expediency and less to morality, concerned more with immediate consequences and less with consistency or continuity. Thus the historical soil of the Western legal tradition is being washed away in the twentieth century and the tradition itself is threatened with collapse. The reason for their inclusion to me appears to be twofold. First, although marriage and the dissolution thereof are in many ways a personal matter for the parties, social history tells us that the state has always regarded them as matters of public concern. Secondly, and perhaps more important, the need was recognised for a uniformity in legislation on these subject matters throughout the Commonwealth. In a single community throughout which intercourse was to be absolutely free provision was required whereby there could be uniformity in the laws governing the relationship of marriage and the consequences of the relationship as well as the dissolution thereof. Differences between the States in the laws governing the status and the relationship of married persons could be socially divisive to the harm of the new community which was being created.
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The Western Australian Jurist 21 ! [T]he nineteenth century use of terms of approval, like "marriages throughout Christendom" or marriages according to the law of "Christian states", or terms of disapproval, like "marriages among infidel nations" served only to obscure circularity of reasoning. Each was a term which
Quinlan, Christianity and the Law 2018 ! sought to mask the adoption of a premise which begged the question of what "marriage" means.
119
In describing the phrases used in the 19 th century marriage cases as obscuring 'circularity of reasoning' the High Court missed the depth of philosophical and historical meaning conveyed by those shorthand expressions which were simply a 'convenient way of expressing the idea'
to use the expression used in Brinkley v Attorney General. As a consequence, the High Court departed substantially from 'Christian marriage' in giving the term 'marriage' as used in the Australian Constitution this meaning:
arriage' is to be understood in s 51(xxi) of the Constitution as referring to a consensual union formed between natural persons in accordance with legally prescribed requirements which is not only a union the law recognises as intended to endure and be terminable only in accordance with law but also a union to which the law accords a status affecting and defining mutual rights and obligations … 120
As Anne Twomey has observed, in doing so, the High Court included its own formulation of essential components of its redefinition of marriage: it must be consensual, it must be between natural persons albeit of indeterminate number, it must be 'intended to endure' and it must not be terminable at the will of the parties but only 'in accordance with law'. 121 The
High Court provided no explanation as to why the particular features that it preserved in its definition of marriage ought to be mandatory for a relationship to be within the legislative powers of the Commonwealth in relation to 'marriage'. Nor did the High Court adequately explain why others, particularly those which had been hitherto an enduring feature of 'marriage' as it has always been understood within the Western legal tradition, were jettisoned. In reaching its conclusion the High Court departed from its own logic. At the same time as the High Court rejected the term 'marriage' as having a fixed meaning it created its own new fixed meaning of the term.
To support its view, that marriage had never had a fixed meaning but was a 'juristic concept', the High Court referred to divorce and to the reality of polygamous and same sex marriages in some overseas countries. 122 With respect to the Court, the reality of polygamy in other countries was not a new development by any means. It had been recognised and addressed Similarly the High Court's use of divorce as a key foundation for its view that that marriage had never had a fixed meaning in Australia ignored the fact that divorce was sufficiently recognised as a reality in Australia at the time of Federation for it to have been included as a separate and specific head of power in the Australian Constitution.
125
In reaching its own finding of an understanding of marriage not found in earlier jurisprudence or legislation, the High Court failed to recognise the reality of fixed attributes of marriage as understood within the Western legal tradition: long-standing natural law and Christian conceptions of marriage as between only one man and one woman. It is perhaps not surprising that the High Court failed to grasp these fundamental and consistently found attributes of marriage within the Western tradition because the principle 19 th century cases
Quinlan, Christianity and the Law 2018 In describing the consequences for religious believers as feeling 'undervalued and even persecuted' Lester diminishes the true impact that religious believers in these situation can face if they do not conform and compromise their beliefs. In addition to the fines, penalties and requirements to attend education programs anti-discrimination laws of this kind hurt more than 'feelings' when they preclude those religious believers impacted by them by acting consistently with a characteristic of their personhood which is integral to their flourishing as a person: their religious faith. As Laycock and Berg have observed:
[C]ommitted religious believers argue that some aspects of human identity are so fundamental that they should be left to each individual, free of all nonessential regulation, even when manifested in conduct. For religious believers, the conduct at issue is to live and act consistently with the demands of the Being that they believe made us all and holds the whole world together. 
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The Western Australian Jurist 27 ! ! ! ! complainant had identified a potential breach of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas). Whilst the religious motivations of the defendants were evident, the evidence did not establish that they prevented anyone from accessing the relevant clinic, or that they threatened, intimidated, badgered, harangued or attacked anyone, they were convicted. 159 The defendants' arguments that the legislation offended the implied freedom of political communication were also rejected by the Magistrate. 160 In Victoria, Mrs Kathy Clubb was arrested and successfully prosecuted under the Victorian legislation. Mrs Clubb had entered an 'exclusion zone' around an abortion clinic and provided a pamphlet to and spoken with a couple entering an abortion clinic. The arresting officer noted that the protesters 'were law abiding people' and that he 'didn't want them coming before the Courts.' 161 The Victorian legislation, among other things, precludes any In the ACT case, the prosecution failed to establish a breach of the ACT legislation by three
Christians silently praying within the relevant exclusion zone. Two of the men prayed silently whilst they walked outside the office building in which an abortion clinic operated. The
Magistrate was most concerned by the Christian who sat down on a bench and silently prayed the rosary. 167 In this case a defence relying on the implied freedom of political communication was again unsuccessful. 168 The defendants succeeded in the case as the Court found that they were involved in a protest by silently praying in a manner which attracted no attention to them. After careful consideration the Magistrate made this finding despite one man having rosary beads with him. 169 The judgment leaves open the possibility that acts of private prayer if sufficiently visible to others might be considered to offend the legislation.
The conclusions of the Court warrant attention as they demonstrate the Pythonesque nature of the inquiry a Court is required to undertake in applying this legislation to prayers:
The defendants contend they were simply engaged in individual private prayer, which was not evident to others, and they therefore were not involved in a protest, by any means.
The Western Australian Jurist 31 ! the centrality of the law, the moral authority of the law, and fidelity to the law become questionable in themselves. Whether the law can be divorced from its Christian roots without, over time, jettisoning the nation's entire moral and ethical frame and the Western legal tradition which is its inheritance is something which is difficult to predict. In the meantime, law and religion are rapidly moving from a period of trial separation towards an acrimonious divorce. The failure of existing law to provide adequate protection to freedom of religion in the examples given in this article suggests a need for greater protection.
